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ABSTRACT—Conservation easements, a valuable tool in the
conservationist’s toolbox, have grown increasingly popular since the
1980s, when Congress introduced changes to the federal tax code making
easement donations more financially attractive. And with deductions
reaching hundreds of thousands, or even millions, of dollars, conservation
easement deductions are big business. However, expanded incentives and
loosened regulations invite abuse, especially when the tax implications are
large and donated easements are hard to value. Valuation of real estate
remains an inexact science, dependent on inconsistent appraisal methods
and subjectivity. Conservation easements can be even more difficult to
value than other easements because, by their very nature, they are often
placed on a parcel of land with high idiosyncratic value. Thus, easement
valuations can vary wildly and justifying a high valuation is not difficult. It
should come as no surprise, then, that the Internal Revenue Service (IRS)
has examined conservation easement valuations more closely in recent
years. Taxpayers risk large fines while the IRS struggles to effectively
identify and curb abuse. Both sides would benefit from greater
predictability, and as the IRS continues its aggressive litigation, a solution
is sorely needed. This Note examines in Part I conservation easements and
valuation methods for federal conservation easement deductions. Part II
explores recent challenges to taxpayer application of these methods and the
problems with the current valuation system revealed by those cases.
Finally, Part III first reviews recent proposed reforms to conservation
easement deduction valuation as well as their shortfalls, and then
introduces a recommendation that would simplify the valuation process as
well as promote greater use of conservation easements.
AUTHOR—J.D., Northwestern University School of Law, 2015; M.A.,
Savannah College of Art and Design, 2012; B.A., Purdue University, 2008.
Many thanks to Professor David Cameron for his invaluable feedback, to
Professor Michael Barsa for his generous mentoring, and to the
Northwestern University Law Review staff for their essential work.

739

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 740
I. CONSERVATION EASEMENT DEDUCTIONS AND THEIR PURPOSE ................................ 743
A. Conservation Easement Deduction Requirements............................................. 745
B. Methods of Conservation Easement Valuation ................................................. 745
C. Penalties for Inaccurate Valuation ................................................................... 752
II. VALUATION PROBLEMS REVEALED BY RECENT LITIGATION .................................... 753
A. The Uncertainty of Appraisals .......................................................................... 753
B. Cost of Appraisals and Risk of Loss Is Substantial ........................................... 756
C. Valuations May Not Capture Conservation Value ............................................ 757
D. Scope of Valuation Challenges and Abuse ........................................................ 760
III. A NEW VALUATION PROPOSAL ................................................................................ 762
A. Recent Proposals Fail to Solve Valuation Problems......................................... 763
B. “Alternative Minimum Value” Is a New Way Forward .................................... 767
CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................ 771

INTRODUCTION
Drive about three hours north from San Francisco on the 101 and
head inland on California State Route 20 and you will find, nestled in the
foothills of the North Coast Mountain Range, 882 acres of undeveloped
wilderness known as the Blue Lakes Ranch. 1 Owned by Michael S.
Mountanos, the ranch serves primarily a recreational purpose, including
deer hunting. 2 Surrounded almost entirely by federally owned land, the
Mountanos family can only access the property through an easement on
federal land restricted to single-family use. 3
In 2005, Mountanos donated a conservation easement on the ranch to
the Golden State Land Conservancy. 4 He subsequently claimed a valuation
of $4,691,500 for the easement, claiming the maximum allowed deduction
of $1,343,704 for the 2005 tax year. 5 Mountanos carried forward the
remainder of the deduction for tax years 2006, 2007, and 2008.6 The IRS
then challenged Mountanos’s deduction, claiming a misuse of the before1

Mountanos v. Comm’r, 105 T.C.M. (CCH) 1818, 1818 (2013).
Id.
3
Id.
4
Id. at 1818–19.
5
Id. at 1819. A taxpayer may claim a deduction equal to the value of the donated conservation
easement. 26 U.S.C. § 170(b)(1)(E) (2012). However, taxpayers are capped at a certain amount
annually, the excess of which, subject to certain limitations, may be carried forward up to fifteen years.
Id.; see also infra Part I.A.
6
Peter J. Reilly, Conservation Easement No Deduction for Hypothetical Vineyard, FORBES (June 5,
2013, 8:33 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/peterjreilly/2013/06/05/conservation-easement-nodeduction-for-hypothetical-vineyard/ [http://perma.cc/44JT-GZHT].
2
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and-after method of valuation. 7 The Tax Court in 2013 accepted the IRS’s
arguments, finding the easement’s actual value to be zero and imposing a
40% penalty on Mountanos’s tax deficiency for the last three years he
claimed the deduction. 8
Mountanos’s reversal of fortune—in the form of a $1.5 million invoice
from the IRS—is not uncommon. In recent years, a flurry of cases brought
by the IRS has wreaked similar havoc on many taxpayers’ returns.9
Ultimately, Mountanos ended up no worse off due to the fine, thanks to a
statute of limitations relieving liability for 2005, but still faced an
unexpected tax bill of over $1 million for underpayment and penalties in
tax years 2006–2008. 10 Others were not so lucky. 11
The Mountanos case reveals deeper problems with the current
conservation easement valuation regime. First, the burden of proof and
other procedural rules promote an all-or-nothing valuation result:
Mountanos held the burden of proving that his calculation supported his
$4.7 million valuation, 12 and his failure to meet that burden resulted in a
valuation of zero and a substantial fine. 13 Most likely, the easement was not
truly valueless, but its real value may not be capable of measurement by a
market-based approach. 14 In fact, a predominant factor in conservation
easement donation is often the worry or frustration that future owners will
view the property solely through a financial lens and not properly consider
its conservation value. 15
7
Taxpayers can abuse this method by inflating the before-easement value and deflating the aftereasement value to maximize the difference between the two. See infra Part I.B.2 and accompanying
notes.
8
Mountanos, 105 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1822.
9
The IRS shows no sign of slowing down. As of May 2014, courts had issued decisions in over
forty separate cases regarding conservation easement valuation since 2005, with eleven coming in 2013
and six in the first five months of 2014. NANCY A. MCLAUGHLIN & STEPHEN J. SMALL, TRYING TIMES:
IMPORTANT LESSONS TO BE LEARNED FROM RECENT FEDERAL TAX CASES INVOLVING CONSERVATION
EASEMENTS 68–70 (2014). The IRS also continues to litigate conservation easements on various other
technical grounds. E.g., Zarlengo v. Comm’r, 108 T.C.M. (CCH) 155 (2014).
10
See Reilly, supra note 6. Reilly estimates that Mountanos saved as much as $470,000 by
claiming the conservation easement deduction in 2005, as compared to an estimated $440,000 fine. Id.
11
See, e.g., Gorra v. Comm’r, 106 T.C.M. (CCH) 523, 523 (2013) (taxpayer facing a total
deficiency of $104,971 and total penalties of $37,431); Pollard v. Comm’r, 105 T.C.M. (CCH) 1249,
1250 (2013) (taxpayer facing a total deficiency of $217,482 and total penalties of $43,497).
12
Mountanos, 105 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1819.
13
Id. at 1822.
14
See infra Part II.C; cf. Brian Angelo Lee, Just Undercompensation: The Idiosyncratic Premium
in Eminent Domain, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 593, 595 (2013) (“[T]here is a well-established consensus
[that] . . . the fair market value standard systematically undercompensates . . . because individual
owners value particular pieces of property for many personal reasons not shared by the market as a
whole.”).
15
See, e.g., CAMILLA M. HERLEVICH & LEE LEWIS LEIDY, CONSERVATION & HISTORIC
PRESERVATION EASEMENTS TO PRESERVE NORTH CAROLINA’S HERITAGE 8 (2d ed. 2004),
http://www.coastallandtrust.org/images/CoastalLandTrust/site/home/media-library/conservation-
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On a certain level, this issue fits into the same trade-off calculation
inherent in all tax deductions between biasing the government or the
taxpayer. 16 A danger in not finding a proper balance is that downward
pressure on valuation and threats of financial liability will discourage
conservation easement donations. Congress’s aggressive expansion of the
conservation easement deduction and the concomitant increase in the
creation of such easements indicates that the deduction is an important
factor to landowners. 17 But some taxpayers, facing this perilous labyrinth of
valuation methods, may decide that claiming a conservation easement
deduction is not worth the trouble.18 Of course, high-income individuals
facing hundreds of thousands of dollars in tax savings quickly justify hiring
tax and appraisal professionals. However, simplifying the conservation
easement valuation system would open the deduction to lower-income
individuals who might donate a conservation easement on their historic
home or other smaller-scale properties. 19 As development continues to
encroach on open spaces and historic landmarks, private-sector
conservation has become critical to preserving our natural and cultural
resources. 20
The ultimate effect is that the tax code fails to realize its potential to
effectively encourage donations of conservation easements. 21 This Note
begins by exploring the benefits of conservation easements, then discussing
the conservation easement deduction program and outlining the various
valuation methods used. Next, this Note assesses the problems that recent
historic-preservation-easement-book.pdf [http://perma.cc/NS99-XPEF] (“My sisters and I inherited the
thousand-acre Cataloochee Ranch where we grew up[,] . . . one of the few remaining ‘balds’ or ancient
mountaintop grassy ecosystems that have long graced the Southern Appalachians. . . . The ranch’s
appraised value doubled in a few short years and would no doubt climb higher. We had no interest in
selling, but our heirs would face increasingly insurmountable pressures to sell.”).
16
See Interstate Transit Lines v. Comm’r, 319 U.S. 590, 593 (1943) (noting “the now familiar rule
that an income tax deduction is a matter of legislative grace and that the burden of clearly showing the
right to the claimed deduction is on the taxpayer”). See generally Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465
(1935) (establishing the business purpose and substance over form doctrines); Marvin A. Chirelstein &
Lawrence A. Zelenak, Tax Shelters and the Search for a Silver Bullet, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1939
(2005).
17
See Zachary Bray, Reconciling Development and Natural Beauty: The Promise and Dilemma of
Conservation Easements, 34 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 119, 129 (2010) (“From 1981 to 2005, the annual
growth rate of private land trusts was . . . at its highest, about 16%, from 1985–1988—a period
coincident with the early expansion of the federal tax deduction.”).
18
See Kate B. Deal, Note, Incentivizing Conservation: Restructuring the Tax-Preferred Easement
Acceptance Process to Maximize Overall Conservation Value, 101 GEO. L.J. 1587, 1603–04 (2013).
19
See id. at 1601–02.
20
See LEIDY & HERLEVICH, supra note 15, at 5 (noting that “private conservation action is more
important than ever before” in light of the North Carolina government’s failure to fulfill the “Million
Acre [Land Acquisition] Plan”).
21
See generally Elliott G. Wolf, Note, Simultaneously Waste and Wasted Opportunity: The
Inequality of Federal Tax Incentives for Conservation Easement Donations, 31 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 315
(2012) (finding inefficiencies in the conservation easement deduction program).
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litigation over valuation methods has revealed, including the uncertainty of
appraisals, the risk of loss for incorrect valuations, and the current system’s
inability to properly capture conservation value. Finally, this Note
concludes by examining recent proposals before suggesting a new approach
to reduce taxpayer risk of loss and facilitate the true recognition of
conservation value.
I. CONSERVATION EASEMENT DEDUCTIONS AND THEIR PURPOSE
Conservation easements can cover a wide variety of properties and
serve many different purposes. The core purpose of conservation
easements, however, is to protect a property from the inexorable march of
development. By law, qualifying conservation easements cover either
unimproved land or historic buildings.22
The conservation easement also solves the problem of finite
ownership. One cannot own a property forever, but one may wish to protect
a property from destruction forever. 23 Conservation easements prevent
future owners from altering the property contrary to the precepts of the
easement. 24 Typically, a conservation easement on open land will limit or
restrict all development on the land, whereas a conservation easement on a
historic building usually prohibits changes to the historic character of the
exterior of the building (commonly known as a facade easement). 25
Conservation easements can be donated, typically upon sale of the
underlying property, to a land trust, preservation organization, government
agency, or similar not-for-profit organization that enforces the easement
against future property owners. Conservation easements “run with the
land,” such that after one is donated, an individual may freely alienate the
land and any future owners will be subject to the easement. Thus, so long
as the organization entrusted with enforcement of the conservation
easement maintains enforcement, a property is protected from development
indefinitely. 26
The idea behind the conservation easement tax deduction is simple.
Congress recognizes the need for preservation of open land and historic
buildings, yet owning the land outright, or “in fee,” would be expensive
and inefficient. 27 The conservation easement tax deduction encourages
22

See Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(d)(1) (as amended in 2009).
See John L. Hollingshead, Conservation Easements: A Flexible Tool for Land Preservation,
3 ENVTL. LAW. 319, 322–23 (1997).
24
See id. at 321–30.
25
See Jess R. Phelps, Preserving Preservation Easements?: Preservation Easements in an
Uncertain Regulatory Future, 91 NEB. L. REV. 121, 126, 128–132 (2012).
26
See Jess R. Phelps, Moving Beyond Preservation Paralysis? Evaluating Post-Regulatory
Alternatives for Twenty-First Century Preservation, 37 VT. L. REV. 113, 143–44 (2012).
27
See Hollingshead, supra note 23, at 322. State and local land trusts conserved over sixteen
million acres in 2010, yet only two million of those acres were owned outright by the land trusts. LAND
23
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private landowners to voluntarily restrict the use of their land in exchange
for a decrease in taxes owed to the federal government. 28 The deduction has
succeeded in increasing the amount of land protected by conservation
easements. 29 In fact, one study estimated that conservation easements held
by state and local land trusts grew from 128,000 acres in 1980 (when
Congress overhauled charitable tax deductions) to 8.8 million acres in
2010. 30
However, many commentators have recently questioned the program’s
efficacy in relation to its conservation goals.31 But even its harshest critics
call for reformation of the tax incentives, not elimination, recognizing the
tax code’s unique role in promoting conservation.32 Although the relatively
small size of the program would normally generate little attention from
Congress, 33 the expiration of expanded conservation easement deduction
benefits at the end of 2014 has caused supporters to rally for their
reinstatement.34 This unusual attention from Congress may represent an
ideal opportunity for reform. 35
TRUST ALLIANCE, 2010 NATIONAL LAND TRUST CENSUS REPORT 5, http://www.landtrustalliance.org/
land-trusts/land-trust-census/2010-final-report [http://perma.cc/X9U-T369].
28
See Phelps, supra note 26, at 129.
29
See Bray, supra note 17, at 129; see also Roger Colinvaux, The Conservation Easement Tax
Expenditure: In Search of Conservation Value, 37 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 19 (2012) (“[T]here is little
doubt that the easement program has been effective in generating easement contributions.”).
30
Nancy A. McLaughlin, Perpetual Conservation Easements in the 21st Century: What Have We
Learned and Where Should We Go from Here?, 2013 UTAH L. REV. 687, 690, 693.
31
See, e.g., Colinvaux, supra note 29, at 21–26, 31–34 (“[A]n easement’s value for tax purposes is
a negative value. . . . Unlike the value of other types of charitable contributions, easement value says
little about the benefit to charity, or, as described here, the conservation value.”); Josh Eagle, Notional
Generosity: Explaining Charitable Donors’ High Willingness to Part with Conservation Easements,
35 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 47, 82 (2011) (positing that the federal government “overpay[s] for the
public benefits created by conservation easements” by as much as “several hundred thousand dollars”
per easement); Wolf, supra note 21, at 324–26 (“[T]ax incentives to induce the donation of
conservation easements should not increase as incomes increases.”).
32
See, e.g., Colinvaux, supra note 29, at 47–60 (proposing the replacement of the deduction with a
tiered tax credit system); Eagle, supra note 31, at 88–89 (proposing the conversion of conservation
easements to development rights); Wolf, supra note 21, at 326–30 (proposing the replacement of the
deduction with a refundable tax credit).
33
Conservation easement deductions represented less than 0.5% of charitable deductions in 2010.
Richard Rubin, IRS Cracks Down on Breaks in Land of Rich Americans, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 22, 2013,
3:07 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-11-06/irs-cracks-down-on-breaks-in-land-of-richamericans.html [http://perma.cc/KUC-3HKC]. Despite the small number of donations, easements
represented the category with the second-highest average donation per return in 2010. Pearson Liddell
& Janette Wilson, Individual Noncash Contributions, 2010, STATISTICS OF INCOME BULL. Winter 2013,
at 64, 65, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/13innoncash10.pdf [http://perma.cc/CBJ4TGWF].
34
The Enhanced Easement Incentive, LAND TRUST ALLIANCE, http://www.landtrustalliance.org/
policy/tax-matters/campaigns/the-enhanced-easement-incentive [http://perma.cc/P25B-QH4U].
35
In February 2015, the House of Representatives voted 279–127 in favor of a bill to make the
expanded benefits permanent, a measure also included by President Obama in his Fiscal Year 2016
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A. Conservation Easement Deduction Requirements
Conservation easement deductions are permitted under 26 U.S.C.
§ 170, which governs all charitable deductions in the tax code. The code
generally disallows a deduction for the contribution of partial interest in a
property, such as an easement, unless the donation is a “qualified
conservation contribution.” 36 Qualified conservation contributions comprise
three elements: (1) a “qualified real property interest,” (2) donated to a
“qualified organization” (3) “exclusively for conservation purposes.”37
Conservation easements are a qualified real property interest by virtue of
being a restriction on use granted in perpetuity. 38 (Conservation easements
are not inherently granted in perpetuity but must be to qualify for the
deduction.) The definitions of “qualified organization” and “exclusively for
a conservation purpose” are beyond the scope of this Note and have no
bearing on the analysis that follows. 39
As with all deductions for charitable contributions, the conservation
easement deduction may be claimed by businesses and individuals alike. 40
Individuals, however, are subject to certain limitations on the amount that
may be claimed in a given year. 41 Conservation easements receive a special
carryover treatment, whereby if the value of a conservation easement
deduction exceeds the allowable amount in the first year claimed, the
balance of the deduction’s value may be applied in future tax years for up
to fifteen years. 42
B. Methods of Conservation Easement Valuation
Claiming the conservation easement tax deduction is a mostly simple
affair, but requires a value to be placed on the donated easement, which
may be a complex process. The intuitive answer to how a conservation
easement should be valued might be to measure the value of what is
conserved by the easement. Indeed, some have suggested that the program

budget.
How
You
Can
Help,
LAND
TRUST
ALLIANCE
(July
30,
2014),
http://www.landtrustalliance.org/policy/tax-matters/campaigns/how-you-can-help
[http://perma.cc/
A5U3-TUCB].
36
26 U.S.C. § 170(f)(3)(B)(iii) (2012).
37
Id. § 170(h)(1).
38
Id. § 170(h)(2)(C).
39
See id. § 170(h)(3) (definition of qualified organization); id. § 170(h)(4) (definition of
conservation purpose); id. § 170(h)(5) (definition of exclusively for conservation purposes). Historic
structures are subject to a variety of complicated rules for qualification and amount of deduction
allowable, but do not see different treatment for valuation purposes. See id.
40
See id. § 170(a).
41
Id. § 170(b)(1)(B), (b)(1)(E)(i). The ultimate effect of these rules is that, in most cases, a
conservation easement deduction will not offset more than 30% of the taxpayer’s adjusted gross
income.
42
Id. § 170(b)(1)(E)(ii).
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be modified to better reflect the true conservation value of the easement.43
However, the IRS—perhaps merely to stay consistent with the rest of the
tax code—determines the value of the deduction to be the fair market value
of the conservation easement at the time of donation.44 Thus, the IRS
measures the easement’s value by the economic value relinquished, rather
than the societal or other value created.
A number of methods are used to measure the fair market value of the
donated easement. The five most common methods are described below,
along with the challenges these methods present to the taxpayer and the
IRS.
1. Comparable Sales Method.—Treasury regulations delineate two
valid methods of determining the fair market value of a conservation
easement, commonly known as the comparable sales and the before-andafter methods. 45 A plain reading of the regulation appears to make the
comparable sales method mandatory when comparable sales exist. 46
Taxpayers have argued this position before, as in Trout Ranch, LLC v.
Commissioner, 47 but no court has yet ruled definitively on the matter. The
Tenth Circuit, in the Trout Ranch appeal, seemingly endorsed a mandatory
preference for the comparable sales method,48 but a subsequent Tax Court
decision referred to the comparable sales method as merely “ideal,” 49 thus
leaving the question unresolved. Ultimately, the court found the sales
records used by the taxpayer to be insubstantial, rendering the question
moot. 50
The Trout Ranch series is not unusual in that regard. Unlike other
forms of real estate, comparable sales for conservation easements are
difficult to find because they are typically gifted and not sold on the open
market. 51 The pool of comparable sales is further reduced by the preference

43
See e.g., Colinvaux, supra note 29, at 37–38; Nancy A. McLaughlin, Increasing the Tax
Incentives for Conservation Easement Donations—A Responsible Approach, 31 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 109–
12 (2004).
44
Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(h)(3)(i) (as amended in 2009).
45
Id.
46
Id. (“If there is a substantial record of sales of easements comparable to the donated easement . . .
the fair market value of the donated easement is based on the sales prices of such comparable
easements.”).
47
Trout Ranch, LLC v. Comm’r (Trout Ranch I), 100 T.C.M. (CCH) 581, 584 (2010), aff’d, 493 F.
App’x 944 (10th Cir. 2012).
48
Trout Ranch, LLC v. Comm’r (Trout Ranch II), 493 F. App’x 944, 949–50 (10th Cir. 2012)
(“[W]here a record of sales of comparable easements is available for meaningful comparison, the
regulations require the appraisal be based on the comparable sales . . . method.”).
49
Mountanos v. Comm’r, 105 T.C.M. (CCH) 1818, 1819 (2013).
50
Trout Ranch II, 493 F. App’x at 950–51.
51
Symington v. Comm’r, 87 T.C. 892, 895 (1986) (“Unfortunately, since most open-space
easements are granted by deed of gift there is rarely an established market from which to derive the fair
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for local comparable sales because values for similar properties can vary
geographically. 52 What makes Trout Ranch notable is that the taxpayer,
Trout Ranch, LLC, used the comparable sales method yet still did not
prevail. Trout Ranch, LLC, a residential development company, sought to
divide sixty-six acres of undeveloped land into residential lots, and donated
a conservation easement covering 384 acres of undeveloped land to the
Crested Butte Land Trust.53 The taxpayer claimed a valuation of
$2,179,849 for the easement, relying on a comparison of the price of four
different conservation easements sold in the same county. 54
The court rejected each of the prior sales as being insufficiently
comparable for use. Three of the four easements used restricted
development on 100%, 96%, and 89% of the land, respectively, whereas
the Trout Ranch easement only restricted development on usable land by
45%. 55 The fourth easement, while similar in the percentage of land
restricted, provided no benefit to the remaining land developed, whereas
the Trout Ranch easement allowed the encumbered land to be used as
communal ranch land by the residents. 56
Trout Ranch illustrates the difficulty in finding comparable sales,
especially for open land. Real estate tends to be highly differentiable and
idiosyncratic; the court considered such physical features as views, river
access, and highway access, each slightly different for each property. 57
Conservation easements are similarly numerous in their permutations, often
designed to create a specific bundle of property rights rather than a blanket
prohibition on development.58 Without a readily available pool of
comparable sales, conservation easement donors must often resort to
alternate methods of valuation.
2. Before-and-After Method.—Rather than attempt to submit
comparable sales, most taxpayers determine the easement’s value using the
alternative method outlined in the Treasury Regulations: the before-andafter method. As a “general rule,” fair market value under this method is
defined as the difference between the land’s value before the donation of
the conservation easement and the land’s value after the donation of the
market value.”); see also Hilborn v. Comm’r, 85 T.C. 677, 688 (1985) (rejecting the comparable sales
method after finding no established market for facade easements).
52
Whitehouse Hotel Ltd. P’ship v. Comm’r (Whitehouse III), 139 T.C. 304, 329–30 (2012), aff’d,
755 F.3d 236 (5th Cir. 2014) (rejecting the use of comparable sales in a national market where
sufficient local comparable sales existed).
53
Trout Ranch I, 100 T.C.M. (CCH) 581, 582 (2010), aff’d, 493 F. App’x 944 (10th Cir. 2012).
54
Id. at 583–84.
55
Id. at 585.
56
Id.
57
Id. at 584–85.
58
See id. Proposed developments assessed by the Trout Ranch court included a single-family
ranch, a planned housing development, and recreational land. Id.
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conservation easement.59 If the easement results in financial benefit to the
donor, such as receiving historic preservation tax credits from a facade
easement, the financial benefit is subtracted from the value of the
easement. 60
For example, the taxpayer’s appraiser in Scheidelman v. Commissioner
valued her brownstone row house in the historic Fort Greene neighborhood
of Brooklyn at $1,015,000. 61 Scheidelman wished to donate a facade
easement on the building to the National Architectural Trust that would
prohibit alteration of the facade and require the owner to maintain the
facade. 62 The appraiser valued the row house with such restrictions at
$900,000. 63 The value of the conservation easement deduction was thus the
difference between the two valuations, or $115,000. 64
Under this method, the taxpayer has two opportunities to increase the
amount of the conservation easement deduction by either inflating the
before-value or deflating the after-value. Easements are often placed on
historic buildings or other land that requires specialized appraisal skills to
reach an accurate before-value, and the extremely limited market for
development restrictions makes calculating the after-value reliant on
guesswork. 65 Of course, the IRS has the same opportunities to show a
decreased value in the deduction.
When appraising a property’s before-value, one must consider the
value of the property at its highest and best use.66 Such a use may differ
greatly from its actual use, such as in Mountanos, and provides an
opportunity for the taxpayer to inflate the appraisal value of the property.
Mountanos claimed a high before-valuation, arguing that the land in
question, while currently used only for recreation, could be put to more
valuable use as a vineyard. 67 The courts presume that the current use is the
highest and best use, 68 and the burden is on the taxpayer to show that an
alternative use is “close[] in time” and “reasonabl[y] probab[le].”69
Mountanos needed to show a higher and better use because the donated
easement did not restrict the contemporaneous recreational use.70 The court
found that creating a vineyard would not be possible because of other
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
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Id.
Scheidelman v. Comm’r (Scheidelman II), 682 F.3d 189, 192 (2d Cir. 2012).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Phelps, supra note 25, at 148–49.
Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(h)(3)(ii) (as amended in 2009).
Mountanos v. Comm’r, 105 T.C.M. (CCH) 1818, 1820 (2013).
United States v. L.E. Cooke Co., 991 F.2d 336, 341 (6th Cir. 1993).
Hilborn v. Comm’r, 85 T.C. 677, 689 (1985).
Mountanos, 105 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1820.
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restrictions placed on the land, including the lack of a permit to divert
water from a nearby creek and a preexisting contract with the county to
restrict development. 71 Thus, because there was no difference in use before
and after the easement, there was no difference in the property’s value,
giving the conservation easement deduction a value of zero. 72 As discussed
in greater detail below, the “closeness in time” requirement is at odds with
the perpetual nature of conservation easements, and ignores the ability of
parties to take future actions, such as obtaining a water permit or breaching
a contract.
Treasury regulations specify that the after-valuation must consider the
highest and best use after the conservation easement, which may give a
different value than the before-valuation’s highest and best use or current
use. 73 This requirement was an issue in Whitehouse Hotel Ltd. Partnership
v. Commissioner, where the taxpayer placed conservation easements on
two adjacent historic buildings in downtown New Orleans: the Kress and
the Maison Blanche. 74 After the donation, the taxpayer combined the two
buildings with the intention of converting the combined properties into a
luxury hotel. 75
The taxpayer structured the easements in such a way that, if the two
buildings were kept separate, they could build additional floors onto the
Kress building. 76 However, if combined into a single structure, the
easement restrictions on the Maison Blanche would prevent construction on
the Kress. 77 The taxpayer claimed a conservation easement deduction of
$7,445,000, the difference between a 780-room luxury hotel and a 720room luxury hotel (the additional sixty rooms being the hypothetical Kress
addition). 78 The Tax Court rejected the taxpayer’s valuation, finding that
the conservation easements on their face did not preclude the construction
of additional floors on the Kress building, giving no difference in value.79
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit found that the Tax Court erred in not
considering the imminent combination of the buildings because a
subsequent buyer would likely purchase both buildings and consider them a
single building. 80 A corollary to Mountanos, the issue here is that of
reasonable probability. The Tax Court thought it reasonably probable that
71

Id.
Id. at 1822.
73
Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(h)(3)(ii) (as amended in 2009).
74
Whitehouse Hotel Ltd. P’ship v. Comm’r (Whitehouse II), 615 F.3d 321, 324–25 (5th Cir. 2010).
75
Id. at 325.
76
Id. at 337.
77
Id.
78
Id. at 325–27.
79
Whitehouse Hotel Ltd. P’ship v. Comm’r (Whitehouse I), 131 T.C. 112, 134–35 (2008), vacated,
615 F.3d 321 (5th Cir. 2010).
80
Whitehouse II, 615 F.3d at 338–39.
72
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the buildings could be sold separately, allowing for a higher and better use,
while the Fifth Circuit disagreed.
The highest and best use is thus a “matter of valuation,” not a strict
matter of fact.81 Determining the highest and best use of a property entails
making several judgments backed by logic or intuition instead of
economics or market data. Without an objective rubric, before-and-after
valuation becomes much more of an art than a science, easily molded by
the artistic flourishes of the appraiser.
3. Reproduction Cost Method.—Where the comparable sales or
before-and-after methods are unavailable, taxpayers usually turn to one of
three methods of valuation not explicitly endorsed by the IRS but
sometimes successful in the courts. The reproduction cost method is one
that can be used when the conservation easement encumbers a historic
building. 82 The reproduction cost method is simply the calculation of what
it would cost to reproduce a historic building. The courts disfavor this
method because it “almost invariably tends to inflate valuation.”83 This is
because the cost of reproduction determines the maximum price of a
structure, not necessarily the fair market value, which would likely be
lower due to negotiation, competition, and desired rates of return on
investment. 84 Further, the reproduction method is inappropriate where the
building would not be reproduced if destroyed. 85 Although this seems
overly literal on first read, the reproduction cost would, by definition, be
higher than the maximum market value if no one would be willing or
required to rebuild the structure.
The reproduction cost method is allowed in a small number of cases
but is limited to those in which reproduction cost is the only method that
will yield a useful result. 86 Such situations arise “when the property to be
valued is unique [and] its market limited.”87 To succeed, a taxpayer must
also show that reproduction would represent a “reasonable business
venture” 88 and that the reproduction value would meaningfully correspond
81

Id. at 339.
Losch v. Comm’r, 55 T.C.M. (CCH) 909, 915 (1988).
83
United States v. Benning Hous. Corp., 276 F.2d 248, 250 (5th Cir. 1960) (footnote omitted); see
also Losch v. Comm’r, 55 T.C.M. (CCH) 909, 915 (1988) (“However, in dealing with an older, historic
structure, it is highly questionable whether the replacement cost method can be used to provide
meaningful results.”).
84
See Benning, 276 F.2d at 250.
85
United States v. Toronto, Hamilton & Buffalo Navigation Co., 338 U.S. 396, 403 (1949); see
also Whitehouse III, 139 T.C. 304, 316 (2012), aff’d, 755 F.3d 236 (5th Cir. 2014) (“Petitioner has
failed to convince us that . . . the owners of the building would want to, or would be required to,
reconstruct that 100-year-old structure if it were destroyed.” (quoting Whitehouse I, 131 T.C. 112, 147
(2008))).
86
Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Kiernan, 366 N.E.2d 808, 812 (N.Y. 1977).
87
Estate of Palmer v. Comm’r, 839 F.2d 420, 424 (8th Cir. 1988).
88
Benning, 276 F.2d at 250.
82
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to the fair market value.89 This extremely high burden of proof means that
the reproduction cost method is rarely used and is of questionable
application to conservation easement valuation.90
4. Income Valuation Method.—The income valuation method of
pricing conservation easements is also rarely employed. Under the income
approach, the taxpayer calculates the discounted present value of all future
cash flows that would derive from the encumbered property, but for the
conservation easement. 91 The value is further discounted by the application
of a risk-adjusted rate of return.92 Essentially, this method is estimating
how much income one would receive by owning the property and adjusting
that downward by the time value of money and the investment risk. Similar
to the reproduction cost method, this amount represents the maximum that
a buyer would pay for the property, but may not accurately represent the
true market value. 93
The income valuation method is disfavored, especially where other
methods, such as comparable sales, are available.94 Calculating the present
value of all future cash flows is very much a fact-intensive endeavor. 95 The
likelihood of succeeding in using this method depends largely on the
reliability, predictability, and recentness of the data used.96 Much like the
before-and-after method, the income valuation method is vulnerable to the
heightened predictions of an overly optimistic or imaginative appraiser.
Despite the difficulty, the income valuation method is successful in
certain cases. Many of these cases involve the subdivision method, so
named because it involves land that will be subdivided into several lots.97
Generally, the lots are priced individually, their values added, and the costs
of sale and development subtracted.98 While the income expectations of
undeveloped land may be more predictable, each variable calculated can
still be subject to a number of different possible values, differences that can
quickly compound. This can add up to multiple experts coming to very
89

Palmer, 839 F.2d at 424.
See Whitehouse III, 139 T.C. at 316 (citing RICHARD R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY
§ 34A.06, 34A-54 (Michael Allen Wolf ed., 2012)).
91
See Butler v. Comm’r, 103 T.C.M. (CCH) 1359, 1368 (2012).
92
Heck v. Comm’r, 83 T.C.M. (CCH) 1181, 1188 (2002) (citing Estate of True v. Comm’r, 82
T.C.M. (CCH) 27, 83 (2001)). Essentially, the riskier the future cash flows, the less a buyer is willing to
pay.
93
See Butler, 103 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1368.
94
See Whitehouse I, 131 T.C. 112, 153 (2008), vacated, 615 F.3d 321 (5th Cir. 2010).
95
See, e.g., id.; Heck, 83 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1188–93 (devoting six pages to valuing shares of a
company).
96
See Allison v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 979 F.2d 1187, 1200 (7th Cir. 1992) (remarking that income
valuation is generally dependent on too many variables to be useful).
97
See, e.g., Trout Ranch I, 100 T.C.M. (CCH) 581, 585 (2010), aff’d, 493 F. App’x 944 (10th Cir.
2012).
98
E.g., id. at 592–93.
90
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different results—none of which might be considered accurate by the
court—and large tax deficiencies for the taxpayer. 99 In short, the income
valuation method is difficult and only accepted as a last resort where better
data is simply unavailable.
5. Fixed Percentage Method.—One might think that a much simpler
method of valuing a conservation easement would be to apply a fixed
percentage based on the average diminution in value. Indeed, taxpayers
commonly attempt this method.100 Despite its frequent use, the Tax Court
has long held that the fixed percentage method is not a valid method of
valuation. 101 Interestingly, the Second Circuit overruled the Tax Court by
upholding appraisals using the fixed percentage as “qualified”—even if
unconvincing—appraisals, thus avoiding the application of penalties to the
taxpayer. 102
C. Penalties for Inaccurate Valuation
Valuing a conservation easement is not only difficult and imprecise,
but also significant penalties can attach when the IRS successfully
challenges a taxpayer’s valuation. Upon a successful challenge, the
taxpayer is first liable for any tax that would have been due above what the
taxpayer paid. 103 The IRS may also pursue a 20% penalty for “inter alia, (1)
negligence or disregard of rules or regulations; (2) any substantial
understatement of income tax; or (3) any substantial valuation
misstatement.” 104 The taxpayer may be further liable for a 40% penalty if
the underpayment of taxes is due to a “gross valuation misstatement.”105
Such a misstatement exists where the reported conservation easement
valuation is at least 400% more than the determined value. 106 IRS
99
See, e.g., id. at 590–91 (calculating an income valuation of $4.45 million for one of the
properties, in contrast to the $5.6 million and $3.22 million values the taxpayer and IRS calculated,
respectively).
100
See, e.g., Scheidelman v. Comm’r (Scheidelman III), 105 T.C.M. (CCH) 1117, 1121 (2013),
aff’d, 755 F.3d 148 (2d Cir. 2014) (“[Taxpayer’s appraiser] determined the value of the easement by
applying an 11.33% discount to the value of the property. His derivation of that percentage was not
based on reliable market data or specific attributes of [taxpayer’s] property, but rather on his analysis of
what the courts and the IRS had allowed in prior cases.”); Gorra v. Comm’r, 106 T.C.M. (CCH) 523,
526 (2013) (taxpayer simply applying 11% to the before-value); Graev v. Comm’r, 140 T.C. 377, 394
(2013) (same).
101
Scheidelman III, 105 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1121 (citing Nicoladis v. Comm’r, 55 T.C.M. (CCH)
624, 629 (1988)).
102
Scheidelman II, 682 F.3d 189, 198–99 (2d Cir. 2012). But see Rothman v. Comm’r, 104 T.C.M.
(CCH) 127, 127 (2012) (rehearing taxpayers’ case after Scheidelman II and rejecting an appraisal that
was “identical in all material respects to the appraisal in . . . Scheidelman” as unqualified).
103
26 U.S.C. § 6211(a) (2012).
104
Pollard v. Comm’r, 105 T.C.M. (CCH) 1249, 1255 (2013) (citing § 6662(a), (b)(1)–(3)).
105
§ 6662(h)(1).
106
See id. § 6662(h)(2)(A)(ii)(I).
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regulations further provide that where an easement is found to be valueless,
thus making a percentage difference impossible to calculate, a gross
valuation misstatement has occurred.107
In recent cases, the IRS has often pursued the 40% penalty associated
with a gross valuation misstatement, with varying levels of success. 108 This
is perhaps due in part to the relative ease of reaching a value of zero. The
IRS needs only to show that the taxpayer failed to shift the burden of proof
either as to a higher and better use, such as in Mountanos, 109 or as to the
proper application of the attempted valuation method, such as in Trout
Ranch, 110 and the easement is presumed valueless, automatically reaching
the 400% threshold for a gross valuation misstatement. Taxpayers must be
aware of the risks of failed valuations and should take steps to show
reasonable, good faith reliance on a qualified professional to avoid
penalties. 111
II. VALUATION PROBLEMS REVEALED BY RECENT LITIGATION
Recent cases where the IRS successfully challenged the taxpayers’
reported value have highlighted the difficulties that valuation poses and the
need for an alternative regime. The major flaws of the current valuation
system can be grouped into three categories: (1) the complexity,
imprecision, and unreliability of appraisals; (2) the cost and risk of loss
from gross valuation misstatements; and (3) the failure of a market value
approach to reflect true conservation value. This section concludes by
assessing the scope of these problems.
A. The Uncertainty of Appraisals
Before donating a conservation easement, a taxpayer should hire a
qualified appraiser to conduct an appraisal of the easement.112 While a
qualified appraisal is not strictly necessary, claiming a charitable deduction

107

Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-5(g) (as amended in 1992); see, e.g., Mountanos v. Comm’r, 105 T.C.M.
(CCH) 1818, 1822 (2013). Most taxpayers reach a settlement with the IRS, so it is unknown how much
of the penalty is typically paid. See infra Part II.D.
108
See, e.g., Gorra v. Comm’r, 106 T.C.M. (CCH) 523, 537 (2013) (upholding penalties); Pollard,
105 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1255–56 (rejecting the enhanced 40% penalty but upholding the 20% penalty);
Evans v. Comm’r, 100 T.C.M. (CCH) 275, 280 (2010) (rejecting penalties).
109
105 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1822.
110
Trout Ranch I, 100 T.C.M. (CCH) 581, 583–84 (2010), aff’d, 493 F. App’x 944 (10th Cir.
2012).
111
Scheidelman v. Comm’r (Scheidelman I), 100 T.C.M. (CCH) 24, 31–32 (2010), vacated, 682
F.3d 189 (2d Cir. 2012) (declining to apply penalties because taxpayer relied on a competent,
experienced appraiser and provided necessary and accurate information to the appraiser). The Tax
Court declined to reconsider the penalty issue on remand. Scheidelman III, 105 T.C.M. (CCH) 1117,
1118 (2013), aff’d, 755 F.3d 148 (2d Cir. 2014).
112
See 26 U.S.C. § 170(f)(11)(E) (2012) (defining qualified appraisal and qualified appraiser).
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is risky without one. 113 Even professional appraisals, however, can vary
significantly in their results. 114 Historic properties and other properties with
idiosyncratic value or unusual features are even more susceptible to
variation. 115
A few recent cases illustrate the challenges that taxpayers may face
when valuing conservation easements. Appraisals must meet a complex set
of criteria, 116 yet recent courts have accepted appraisals as qualified to
varying degrees. The Second Circuit, in Scheidelman II, overturned a Tax
Court decision rendering an appraisal unqualified because the appraiser
used the fixed percentage method, which the appraiser sold as being in line
with historically approved cases, viewing the appraisal instead as a
permissible, if sloppy, application of the before-and-after method.117 The
Tax Court on remand found the valuation to be inaccurate and the true
value to be zero because the easement provided no restriction beyond those
already enforced by the historic district in which it was located.118 Evidence
introduced by the IRS showed that ninety-one nearly identical appraisals
had been previously prepared for the National Architectural Trust.119
Depending on your point of view, this is either evidence of a demand for
simplified valuation or the extent of possible abuse slipping through the
cracks.
Complicating the matter further, the D.C. Circuit upheld a similar
appraisal as qualified in Commissioner v. Simmons, affirming the lower
court’s decision to modify the percentage applied instead of rejecting it
outright. 120 With little justification, the Tax Court applied a 5% reduction in
value, instead of the claimed 11% and 13%.121 Thus, while a basic appraisal
may be deemed “qualified,” insofar as it is reasonable enough to avoid
penalties, it is clear that a stricter standard must be met to prevail on the
valuation amount without challenge. Comparing Scheidelman with
113
The tax code generally provides a safe harbor from underpayment penalties where the taxpayer
acts with reasonable cause and in good faith. Id. § 6664(c)(1). However, the safe harbor is only
available in the case of conservation easement valuations where the taxpayer based the valuation on a
qualified appraisal and separately investigated the value in good faith. Id. § 6664(c)(3).
114
See Mariwyn Evans, How Accurate are Commercial Appraisals?, REALTOR MAG., Oct. 2011,
http://realtormag.realtor.org/commercial/conversations/article/2011/10/how-accurate-are-commercialappraisals [http://perma.cc/EKM8-P45K] (finding appraisals to have a greater than 12% median
deviation from sale prices).
115
See William C. Harvey, II, Is the Price Right?, COM. INVESTMENT REAL EST., Jan.–Feb. 2004,
at 36, 38 (“Valuing unique properties is challenging even for experienced practitioners.”).
116
See Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-13(c)(3)(i)–(ii) (as amended in 1996).
117
682 F.3d 189, 197–98 (2d Cir. 2012) (stating that an appraisal is not unqualified simply because
it is “sloppy” or “unconvincing”).
118
Scheidelman III, 105 T.C.M. (CCH) 1117, 1122 (2013), aff’d, 755 F.3d 148 (2d Cir. 2014).
119
Id. at 1121.
120
646 F.3d 6, 12 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
121
Simmons v. Comm’r, 98 T.C.M. (CCH) 211, 216–17 (2009).
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Simmons, one is left to wonder whether the fixed percentage method is
more palatable where the percentage applied is more modest.
Even a thorough appraisal conducted by a highly qualified appraiser
does not guarantee acceptance by the courts if challenged by the IRS. In a
seventy-three-page opinion, the Tax Court in Whitehouse I rejected the
$7,445,000 valuation submitted by the taxpayer’s expert and the IRS’s
expert valuation of zero in favor of its own analysis, reaching a value of
$1,792,301. 122 Both experts were certified as MAI appraisers, the highest
certification available from the Appraisal Institute, yet reached extremely
divergent valuations. 123 After the Tenth Circuit rejected the Tax Court’s
valuation process, the Tax Court again conducted its own analysis,
reaching a value of $1,857,716. 124 Similarly, in Trout Ranch, the taxpayer’s
expert argued for a valuation of the donated easement of $2.2 million,
while two experts for the IRS argued for a valuation of zero. 125 The Tax
Court rejected all three experts’ valuations and employed its own complex
analysis, reaching a valuation of $560,000. 126 On appeal, the Tenth Circuit
affirmed the Tax Court’s decision, finding no clear error in the Tax Court
conducting its own valuation analysis.127
These cases illustrate the risk to the taxpayer in relying on appraisals,
even those conducted by top-certified experts. Undoubtedly, the divergence
in valuation is exacerbated by the taxpayer’s incentive to claim the largest
reasonable valuation and the IRS’s incentive to find a valuation of zero.
But how can taxpayers know where the boundaries of reasonable valuation
are without the availability of an objectively correct value? The taxpayers
in Whitehouse and Trout Ranch missed the mark by about 400%; even
significant reductions in claimed valuations would have been deemed
incorrect by the IRS and the courts.
Rather than permit the taxpayer to submit another appraisal, the Tax
Court often conducts its own valuation analysis. Commentators have
criticized the Tax Court for relying too heavily on comparable sales, which
are often insufficiently comparable for the “after” valuation because of
unique property characteristics and the small conservation easement
market. 128 Although the Tax Court is experienced and skilled in tax and
valuation issues, accurate valuation data is simply unavailable. Further, it is
122
131 T.C. 112, 118, 128–29, 171–72 (2008), vacated, 615 F.3d 321 (5th Cir. 2010). Despite its
expert’s testimony, the IRS contended the value of the easement to be $1.15 million. Id. at 118.
123
Id. at 118–20.
124
Whitehouse III, 139 T.C. 304, 348 (2012), aff’d, 755 F.3d 236 (5th Cir. 2014).
125
Trout Ranch I, 100 T.C.M. (CCH) 581, 583 (2010), aff’d, 493 F. App’x 944 (10th Cir. 2012).
126
Id. at 585–93.
127
Trout Ranch II, 493 F. App’x at 954.
128
See Stephanie S. Jeane, Note, The Façade of Valuation: Why the Whitehouse Hotel Ltd.
Partnership v. Commissioner Façade Easement Valuation Method Is Not Working, 66 TAX LAW. 501,
511 (2013).
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often unclear what comparable sales should be used in the valuation
analysis. 129
Resolution of valuation through the Tax Court is also problematic
because of the standard of review upon appeal. Appellate courts
considering conservation easement valuation cases apply a clear error
standard of review to the Tax Court’s decision. 130 This standard means that
whereas the Tax Court is free to spend dozens of pages conducting its own
valuation analysis, appellate courts are more constrained and typically only
affirm or remand the case to the Tax Court for another valuation. As
Whitehouse III shows, a remand can result in the Tax Court conducting
another lengthy valuation analysis that reaches roughly the same result.131
These factual battles can last several years and use up valuable resources of
the court, the IRS, and the taxpayer.132
B. Cost of Appraisals and Risk of Loss Is Substantial
The uncertainty of appraisals means that taxpayers risk substantial
sums by claiming a deduction for the donation of a conservation easement.
The risk to the taxpayer is the cost of an appraisal that may not hold up in
court, and substantial penalties that may be imposed on any deficiencies.
The risk of a penalty is exacerbated when the IRS argues, as it often does,
that the taxpayer’s easement is without value.133
When the IRS succeeds in arguing that a donated easement has no
value, the taxpayer can be liable for a significant sum. In Scheidelman, the
taxpayer paid $9,275 to the National Architectural Trust for an appraisal of
her Brooklyn home. 134 When the court eventually found the easement to
hold no value, Scheidelman faced a total deficiency of $35,425 and total
penalties of $7,085. 135 Although the court ultimately refrained from
upholding the penalties, 136 Scheidelman still faced a combined tax bill and
appraisal cost of $44,700. The taxpayer faced a similar burden in
129

See, e.g., Whitehouse I, 131 T.C. 112, 157–58 (2008), vacated, 615 F.3d 321 (5th Cir. 2010)
(calculating highest and best use against local non-luxury hotels’ sales instead of nonlocal luxury
hotels).
130
E.g., Trout Ranch II, 493 F. App’x at 951.
131
139 T.C. 304, 348 (2012), aff’d, 755 F.3d 236 (5th Cir. 2014) (increasing its previous valuation
of $1,792,301 to $1,857,716).
132
The Whitehouse taxpayers claimed their deduction in 1997, but litigation did not conclude until
2012. Id. at 309–10.
133
See, e.g., Scheidelman III, 105 T.C.M. (CCH) 1117, 1122 (2013), aff’d, 755 F.3d 148 (2d Cir.
2014); Trout Ranch I, 100 T.C.M. (CCH) 581, 583 (2010), aff’d, 493 F. App’x 944 (10th Cir. 2012);
Simmons v. Comm’r, 98 T.C.M. (CCH) 211, 216 (2009); see also Jeane, supra note 128, at 511 (“The
Service often asserts the easement is valueless.” (citing Scott D. McClure et al., Courts to IRS: Ease Up
on Conservation Easement Valuations, 124 TAX NOTES 551, 555 (2009))).
134
Scheidelman I, 100 T.C.M (CCH) 24, 26–27 (2010), vacated, 682 F.3d 189 (2d Cir. 2012).
135
Id. at 24.
136
Scheidelman III, 105 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1118.
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Mountanos when the IRS assessed a total deficiency and penalty liability of
over $1.5 million. 137 This sum included a 40% penalty on the taxes that
would have been owed had the taxpayer not claimed the nearly $5 million
deduction spread out over several years.138
Some might consider cases of high-income individuals’ tax liability to
be a minor concern. But the larger goal of conservation is threatened if
such high penalties and deficiency bills are allowed. Our most valuable
natural and historic resources are often those with the greatest market (and
idiosyncratic) value. 139 The risk of large fines and deficiency bills,
combined with the costs of appraisals and possible litigation, may cause
owners of valuable historic properties or large tracts of open land to think
twice about donating a conservation easement. 140 The easement deduction
is designed to incentivize easement donations, but fails to meet that goal if
the risk of deficiencies and fines negates the tax benefit. 141
C. Valuations May Not Capture Conservation Value
A common argument made by the IRS in recent litigation over
conservation easement valuations is that an easement has no value because
it fails to protect the property beyond what existing laws or regulations
provide. In several cases, the courts have agreed. As previously discussed,
the Tax Court in Scheidelman III found the easement to have no value
because the easement provided no restriction beyond those already imposed
by the Fort Greene Historic District. 142 Courts in other cases have
significantly reduced easement valuations due to existing historic district
restrictions. 143
Similarly, the court in Mountanos found a conservation easement
restricting development on open land to have no value because the taxpayer
137

See Reilly, supra note 6.
Id.
139
Cincinnati residents recently struggled to value Union Terminal and Music Hall, which were
both threatened by significant deterioration and on the National Trust for Historic Preservation’s 2014
“11 Most Endangered Historic Places” list. Union Terminal, NAT’L TRUST FOR HISTORIC
PRESERVATION,
http://www.preservationnation.org/issues/11-most-endangered/locations/unionterminal.html [http://perma.cc/4Q75-V5GK]; Music Hall, NAT’L TRUST FOR HISTORIC PRESERVATION,
http://www.preservationnation.org/issues/11-most-endangered/locations/music-hall.html [http://perma.
cc/CBG2-R8CR]. Auditors estimated the value of the buildings in their current state to be only
approximately $37 million combined, but supporters of a $331 million renovation plan said that price
tag didn’t capture the full value to the community. Dan Horn, Value of Iconic Buildings Hard to
Measure, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER (Aug. 7, 2014, 2:43 PM), http://www.cincinnati.com/story/news/
2014/06/22/value-iconic-buildings-hard-measure/11250727/ [http://perma.cc/RB7K-WM8C].
140
Indeed, the number of state and local land trusts has plateaued since 2005, after twenty-five
years of extraordinary growth. McLaughlin, supra note 30, at 689–90. While donations by acreage
continue to grow, the growth rate has slowed since 2005. Id. at 691.
141
See Phelps, supra note 25, at 168.
142
Scheidelman III, 105 T.C.M. (CCH) 1117, 1122 (2013), aff’d, 755 F.3d 148 (2d Cir. 2014).
143
See, e.g., Simmons v. Comm’r, 98 T.C.M. (CCH) 211, 217 (2009).
138
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could not show a higher and better use beyond recreation. 144 Restrictions on
the land imposed by the Williamson Act already prevented residential
development, and federal land surrounding the Mountanos property
restricted access to irrigation necessary for use as a vineyard.145 The
taxpayer failed to provide evidence of another feasible use, rendering the
after-value equivalent to the before-value, giving the easement no value. 146
What these decisions fail to acknowledge is that conservation
easements provide a different level of protection because of their
perpetuity. Laws can be amended, defunded, or repealed; 147 neighboring
land restrictions can be lifted or purchased away; 148 and historic district
regulations can be inconsistent or go unenforced.149 In contrast, land trusts
form endowments, and easement donors are required or heavily encouraged
to donate an amount necessary to cover the endowment’s cost of perpetual
enforcement. 150 While the market may take a long-term view, especially in
real estate, there is a point in time where market variables become too
complex to predict, yet the easement will persist. In cases where the
restricting laws are unlikely to change in the near future, the perpetuity
value may approach de minimis from a market perspective, but retain an
above de minimis value from a conservation perspective. 151
The market is also unlikely to capture these benefits because market
failures often result in improper valuation of the true benefits of
144

Mountanos v. Comm’r, 105 T.C.M. (CCH) 1818, 1820, 1822 (2013).
Id. at 1820–21.
146
Id. at 1822.
147
In 2007, California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger proposed cutting funding to the
Williamson Act. Ramona Frances & Glenna Jarvis, Repeal of Williamson Act Could Change the Face
of Central Valley’s Landscape, MADERA TRIBUNE, July 28, 2007, http://www.maderatribune.com/
news/repeal-williamson-act-could-change-face-central-valleys-landscape
[http://perma.cc/B3QU3PGB]. Had the budget cuts gone through, the contract restricting development on the Mountanos
property may not have been renewed. See id. (“Once these contracts expire and if the County finds it
cannot financially support the program, it would no longer be able to protect farms, ranches and open
space from development.”).
148
The IRS in Mountanos only contended (and the taxpayer failed to refute) that the taxpayer
could not obtain the necessary water permits to build a vineyard. Mountanos, 105 T.C.M. (CCH) at
1820. Obtaining a water use permit may be a minor roadblock to a differently positioned developer.
149
See JULIA FERRARI ET AL., LOCAL HISTORIC DISTRICTS OF NEW HAMPSHIRE 2 (2012),
http://www.nh.gov/nhdhr/publications/documents/lhd_surveyreport2012.pdf
[http://perma.cc/ZG3YK7JV] (estimating that twelve of ninety-six towns in New Hampshire abandoned their historic
commissions or districts between 2006 and 2012).
150
See, e.g., Donating Conservation Easements: When Conservation Practices and Philanthropy
Meet, VT. LAND TRUST, http://www.vlt.org/news-publications/publications-archive/archived-articles/
11-donating-conservation-easements [http://perma.cc/FH9P-Q6TG].
151
Ultimately, a valueless easement, even from a market perspective, is a legal fiction, albeit one
that the courts have upheld. Cf. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1044 (1992) (Blackmun,
J., dissenting) (challenging, in a four-justice dissent, the majority on the idea that a parcel of land is
valueless simply because it is completely barred from its highest and best economic use); Richard A.
Epstein, Why Restrain Alienation?, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 970, 972 (1985).
145
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conservation. Any value gained through conservation is a positive
externality enjoyed by the public, not necessarily the property owner.
Additionally, because public funds for the purchase of conservation
easements are limited, the externality is unlikely to be captured by the
market price.
This point is perhaps best illustrated through a hypothetical, based on
Whitehouse, where the court reached a valuation by comparing the Kress
and Maison Blanche buildings, combined to form a luxury hotel, to nearby
nonluxury hotels. 152 The taxpayers claimed a deduction based on the
easement’s restrictions on building additional floors. 153 Imagine a similar
situation involving a five-story historic hotel with a facade easement placed
on the building proscribing demolition of the building and development
above five floors. Before the easement, perhaps the highest and best use
would be to demolish the building and construct a ten-story nonluxury
hotel, giving a value of $5 million. After the easement, perhaps the highest
and best use would be to operate a five-story luxury hotel that would
generate similar revenue and give an equivalent value of $5 million. The
easement would be deemed to hold no value because the market is
indifferent between a ten-story nonluxury hotel and a five-story luxury
hotel. The IRS would likely respond by noting that the taxpayer has
donated something with no economic value and should thus not be given a
tax deduction.
However, the five-story luxury hotel is producing external benefits by
preserving a historic structure. Often, historic buildings are located in
historic districts (with or without historic district governance) that depend
on the collective preservation of historic buildings to maintain overall
value. The New Orleans Vieux Carré Historic District and Canal Street
Historic District depended on the preservation of the Kress and Maison
Blanche buildings to help maintain the district’s value, 154 but that external
value can go unrecognized in a market-based valuation that only looks to
the effect of the conservation easement on the individual building. 155
So why does the market fail to capture this benefit? It may be that the
market fails to incorporate conservation value because the bargaining
power of conservationists is so limited. If conservation benefits are secondand third-order benefits, accruing first in the above hypothetical to the
Vieux Carré Historic District, then to the economic growth of New Orleans
as a whole, and then to out-of-town visitors to the Historic District, the
likelihood of fully capturing the conservation benefit is hindered by
152

Whitehouse I, 131 T.C. 112, 157–58 (2008), vacated, 615 F.3d 321 (5th Cir. 2010).
Id. at 131–32.
154
The New Orleans Central Business District Historic District Landmark Commission rated the
Maison Blanche building as holding “major architectural importance.” Id. at 116.
155
See generally Colinvaux, supra note 29, at 34–38 (discussing the dichotomy between
conservation value and lost economic value).
153
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multiple layers of transaction costs. Ideally, market actors would have
perfect information about the conservation benefits and be able to
overcome collective action problems to aggregate the money needed to
purchase the optimal mix of conservation easements. But it seems quite
unlikely that land trusts have solved these problems. A market is only as
“perfect” as the information that feeds into it. If transaction costs
consistently prevent conservation “information” from entering the market,
the market will consistently undervalue conservation. While the IRS might
see valuation as purely an exercise in price discovery, the goals of the
conservation easement deduction program are better served if external
conservation value is also considered.
D. Scope of Valuation Challenges and Abuse
Naturally, the final question is how widespread are the risks to the
taxpayer of IRS challenges? Although it is unclear exactly how many
conservation easement deductions are challenged each year by the IRS, an
examination of recent Tax Court data reveals the likelihood of significant
taxpayer risk.
In 2013, the Tax Court issued an opinion for six new cases relating to
conservation easement deductions.156 The IRS sought gross valuation
misstatement penalties in all cases except one. 157 In litigation, the Tax
Court avoided the question of gross valuation misstatement in two cases 158
and found a gross valuation misstatement in three other cases. 159 Only in
one case did the Tax Court deny the penalty, applying the reasonable cause
exception, though the court applied the smaller substantial understatement
penalty. 160
These data fail to answer how many taxpayers do not fully pursue the
issue in court when they are denied deductions or assessed penalties for
gross valuation misstatements. However, by extrapolating from general
trends, one can reach a rough estimate. For fiscal year 2012, only 0.04% of
all taxpayers receiving a notice of deficiency filed a petition with the Tax

156
The Tax Court issued opinions in four additional cases in which the IRS originally argued for
valuation-related penalties. Heard as rehearings per TAX CT. R. 161: Friedberg v. Commissioner, 106
T.C.M. (CCH) 360 (2013); Mitchell v. Commissioner, 106 T.C.M. (CCH) 215 (2013); and Carpenter v.
Commissioner, 106 T.C.M. (CCH) 62 (2013). Heard upon remand from an appellate court: Scheidelman
III, 105 T.C.M. (CCH) 1117 (2013), aff’d, 755 F.3d 148 (2d Cir. 2014).
157
Belk v. Comm’r, 140 T.C. 1 (2013); 61 York Acquisition, LLC v. Comm’r, 106 T.C.M. (CCH)
594 (2013); Gorra v. Comm’r, 106 T.C.M. (CCH) 523 (2013); Graev v. Comm’r, 140 T.C. 377 (2013);
Mountanos v. Comm’r, 105 T.C.M. (CCH) 1818 (2013); Pollard v. Comm’r, 105 T.C.M. (CCH) 1249
(2013).
158
61 York, 106 T.C.M. (CCH) at 596–97; Graev, 140 T.C. at 379 n.2.
159
Gorra, 106 T.C.M. (CCH) at 536 (finding gross valuation misstatement); Mountanos, 105
T.C.M. (CCH) at 1822 (same); Pollard, 105 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1255–56 (same).
160
Pollard, 105 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1256.
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Court. 161 In recent years, about 2% of all Tax Court cases have actually
been tried and decided, with about 80% settled and about 18% dismissed.162
Thus, based on the above data, the six conservation easement
valuation cases in 2013 would represent about 300 cases filed in the Tax
Court and thousands of notices of deficiency received by taxpayers. The
notice of deficiency calculation is clearly unrealistic as only 2933 taxpayers
claimed the deduction in 2010, totaling $766 million. 163 With an average
deduction of over $260,000, one can assume that taxpayers claiming the
deduction are sophisticated enough to file in the Tax Court at a much
higher rate than the general public and less likely to settle out of court. But
even assuming a file rate of 100% instead of 0.04%, the data suggest that at
least 10% of taxpayers claiming the deduction are receiving notices of
deficiency and are at substantial risk of deficiency liability and gross
misstatement valuation penalties.
Of course, it is possible—or even likely—that the IRS is cracking
down because taxpayers are abusing the latitude inherent in appraisals. 164 In
all three cases in 2013 where the Tax Court found a gross valuation
misstatement, the IRS claimed the conservation easement to be valueless.165
However, in Pollard v. Commissioner and Gorra v. Commissioner, the
court found the easement to have significant value (though far less than
claimed by the taxpayer),166 while in Mountanos, the court declined to affix
a value, deciding only that the taxpayer failed to prove any value. 167 Past
cases follow a pattern similar to Pollard and Gorra. 168
This pattern suggests that either (1) there is a wide range of plausible
values and thus taxpayer “abuse” is merely claiming the best plausible
value, (2) many certified appraisers are willing to give grossly inflated
values, or (3) the IRS is engaging in similar abuse in undervaluing

161
NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 2012 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 82 n.43 (2012),
http://www.taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/userfiles/file/Full-Report/Volume-2.pdf
[http://perma.cc/9B8P7857].
162
See id. at 83.
163
Rubin, supra note 33.
164
Janet Novack, Feds Sue Trust Over Historic Easement Tax Breaks, FORBES (June 16, 2011,
1:52 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/janetnovack/2011/06/16/feds-sue-trust-over-historic-easementtax-breaks/ [http://perma.cc/Z28E-WLJ3] (reporting on IRS lawsuit against the Trust for Architectural
Easements, claiming abusive valuation practices).
165
Gorra v. Comm’r, 106 T.C.M. (CCH) 523, 534 (2013); Mountanos v. Comm’r, 105 T.C.M.
(CCH) 1818, 1818 (2013); Pollard, 105 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1249.
166
Gorra, 106 T.C.M. (CCH) at 536; Pollard, 105 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1255.
167
Mountanos, 105 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1819 n.2.
168
See, e.g., Trout Ranch I, 100 T.C.M. (CCH) 581, 591–92 (2010), aff’d, 493 F. App’x 944 (10th
Cir. 2012).
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conservation easements. Perhaps the Tax Court’s willingness to engage in
its own valuation implies that one or both of the latter two are occurring. 169
Strong evidence also exists that many taxpayers shopped around for
favorable appraisals and then used the appraisal to shield themselves from
penalties. 170 At least one easement-holding organization promoted appraisal
shopping as no-risk to the taxpayer, even guaranteeing the return of any
associated donation if the tax benefit was denied.171 The Tax Court’s recent
responses only muddy the issue, as obtaining a qualified appraisal is in
some cases sufficient to avoid penalties, but in other cases, the court has
required that the taxpayer conduct some additional level of investigation
into the appraisal’s veracity, especially if the taxpayer has some base of
relevant knowledge.172 Of course the mixed case law may be attributed to
the difficulty in divining which cases deserve penalties and which do not
because taxpayers come with varying levels of knowledge and expertise. 173
Abuse is obviously problematic for the IRS, but should also concern
conservationists. Abusive valuation spends limited resources on taxpayer
windfalls instead of additional conservation and, if widespread, threatens
the deduction’s future. Conservationists should work with the IRS to
identify ways to curb abuse without also curbing proper easement donation.
Unfortunately, the uncertainty inherent in the current valuation system
means the IRS will always face an uphill battle in trying to stop—or even
identify—abusive valuation. A new way forward is needed, or this
troubling trend of litigation will continue and is bound to harm easements
as a conservation tool, if it hasn’t already.
III. A NEW VALUATION PROPOSAL
Given that the current conservation easement valuation system relies
on inherently inaccurate appraisals, a market-value approach that fails to
fully capture conservation value, and easily abused valuation practices, it is
no surprise that many writers have proposed alternatives. 174 While these
169

It is likely no coincidence that before the IRS began targeting abusive conservation easements,
the Tax Court was loath to conduct its own valuation analyses. See, e.g., Nicoladis v. Comm’r, 55
T.C.M. (CCH) 624, 629 (1988) (“Any judgment of our own would be tainted with the same concerns
[raised by experts for both the taxpayer and the IRS].”); Hilborn v. Comm’r, 85 T.C. 677, 699 (1985)
(acknowledging validity of taxpayer’s valuation concerns but adopting IRS’s valuation as “objective”
rather than taxpayer’s “subjective” valuation).
170
Novack, supra note 164.
171
Graev v. Comm’r, 140 T.C. 377, 381 (2013) (discussing “side letter” sent to taxpayer by the
National Architectural Trust (now Trust for Architectural Easements) offering a return of the donation
if the deduction were denied).
172
Compare Scheidelman I, 100 T.C.M. (CCH) 24, 31–32 (2010), vacated, 682 F.3d 189 (2d Cir.
2012), with Rothman v. Comm’r, 104 T.C.M. (CCH) 127, 127 (2012).
173
Compare Graev, 140 T.C. at 382 (taxpayer occupation of attorney), with Scheidelman I, 100
T.C.M. (CCH) at 31–32 (taxpayer is layperson).
174
See infra Part III.A.
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alternative schemes are often novel and attempt to improve promotion of
conservation or reduce administration costs, none strike the appropriate
balance between conservation, administration, and accuracy of value. As an
alternative, this Note proposes the use of “alternative minimum value” as
both a safe harbor for taxpayers and a better capture of conservation value.
A. Recent Proposals Fail to Solve Valuation Problems
1. Tax Credits and Direct Spending.—A common proposal is to do
away with the charitable deduction donation scheme altogether and replace
it with an alternative method of promoting conservation. Professor Daniel
Halperin suggests replacing the deduction with a direct spending program
(as opposed to the indirect “spending” from tax deductions and credits). 175
The direct spending would come in the form of grants to developers and
target properties with greater conservation value.176 However, as others
have noted, a direct spending program would make already scarce
resources even scarcer 177 and allocate those resources less efficiently. 178
Professor Halperin also suggests a refundable tax credit, 179 an idea
shared by other authors. 180 Such proposals either explicitly state or assume
that the tax credit amount would be calculated as a fixed percentage applied
to the value of the property before the easement.181 Halperin would model
conservation easement tax credits after the low-income tax credit program,
which has successfully promoted affordable housing projects. 182 The credits
would be capped, and distribution would be determined through application
to the Bureau of Land Management or state agencies. 183 Elliott Wolf
proposes simply replacing the deduction with refundable, uncapped tax
175
Daniel Halperin, A Better Way to Encourage Gifts of Conservation Easements, 70 EXEMPT
ORG. TAX REV. 193, 197 (2012).
176
Id.
177
Deal, supra note 18, at 1608 (“A direct-spending program . . . would by political necessity
involve allocation of a fixed dollar amount of funds.”). Recent pressures to cut discretionary spending
across-the-board have resulted in cuts even in programs that are revenue-positive, such as IRS
enforcement. Chuck Marr & Joel Friedman, Cuts in IRS Budget Have Compromised Taxpayer Service
and Weakened Enforcement, CENTER ON BUDGET AND POL’Y PRIORITIES (June 25, 2014),
http://www.cbpp.org/cms/?fa=view&id=4156 [http://perma.cc/SAY2-HG44] (reporting on a Treasury
study showing that every dollar invested in IRS enforcement returns six dollars to the federal
government).
178
Colinvaux, supra note 29, at 48 (“[T]he tax expenditure likely results in lower costs per acre . . .
than a direct spending program.”); see also supra notes 27–30 and accompanying text.
179
Halperin, supra note 175, at 197–98. Instead of decreasing the amount of income subject to tax
as a deduction does, a refundable tax credit is a direct payment to the taxpayer, regardless of the level of
taxable income.
180
Colinvaux, supra note 29, at 41–46, 49–60; Wolf, supra note 21, at 326–30.
181
Colinvaux, supra note 29, at 49–51; Halperin, supra note 175, at 197–98; Wolf supra note 21,
at 329.
182
Halperin, supra note 175, at 197.
183
Id. at 197–98.
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credits, arguing that tax credits more efficiently promote conservation and
are unaffected by donor wealth or income. 184 Finally, Professor Roger
Colinvaux suggests a refundable tax credit broken down into different tiers
based on the level of restriction provided by the easement.185
Refundable, capped tax credits fail to address the underlying problem
with the current valuation system for three reasons. First, tax credits apply
a fixed percentage to the before-value, reaching a value for the
conservation easement that may be unrelated to the value of conservation
achieved or cost to the taxpayer. The taxpayer is then incentivized to
donate the minimum qualifying easement, maximizing the gap between the
tax credit and the easement’s actual value. While Colinvaux’s tiered system
is more nuanced, it merely reduces, rather than eliminates, this counterproductive incentive.
Second, tax credits fail to provide any offsetting reduction in
administrative costs. In fact, requiring agencies to evaluate tax credit
applications, necessary in a capped or tiered system, adds administrative
costs to both the government and the applicant. Although costs to the IRS
and the courts would undoubtedly decrease, it seems unlikely that agency
review of each application would be cheaper than targeted litigation.
Finally, a capped tax credit system would unnecessarily politicize
conservation. Each time Congress considered a new budget proposal, the
amount of conservation tax credits would become a budgetary issue. Tax
deductions do not require any appropriations from Congress and are limited
only by the public’s appetite. 186
2. Easement Qualification Regulation.—If replacing the current
deduction with a tax credit is undesirable, surely improvements can be
made to curb abuse and limit litigation. Some have proposed making the
conservation easement deduction more difficult to claim. 187 Presumably,
taxpayers with more valuable easements or those more committed to the
conservation cause will be more willing to overcome barriers to claiming
the deduction. Further, the taxpayer is incentivized to increase the level of
restriction in the easement to meet a higher qualification standard.
Historic preservation expert Jess Phelps recently advanced the simple
proposition that conservation organizations should require more restrictive
184

Wolf, supra note 21, at 329–30.
Colinvaux, supra note 29, at 50–52.
186
The current effort to reinstate the 2006 expanded benefits is instructive here. Despite
widespread support, the initiative failed in 2013. If Congress were required to periodically review the
conservation easement deduction, it is unlikely that it would be consistently renewed. See supra notes
33–35 and accompanying text. Also instructive is the Historic Tax Credit, currently under threat of
repeal and a focus of the National Trust for Historic Preservation’s lobbying efforts. Historic Tax
Credits, NAT’L TRUST FOR HISTORIC PRESERVATION, http://www.preservationnation.org/takeaction/advocacy-center/policy-resources/historic-tax-credits.html [http://perma.cc/9MYX-LEPN].
187
McLaughlin, supra note 43, at 109; Phelps, supra note 25, at 161–62.
185
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easements from their donors. 188 Phelps theorizes that if the taxpayer is
currently at greater risk of deduction disqualification, conservation
organizations can convince the taxpayer to donate a more restrictive
easement whose valuation is more likely to be upheld.189
Although this goal is laudable, it is also unrealistic. Just as with
appraisers, taxpayers can shop around for a conservation organization that
will accept the desired level of restriction or valuation. 190 Indeed, if cases
like Scheidelman and Graev are any indication, at least one major
conservation group is pursuing taxpayers for conservation easement
donations that skirt the line of abuse.191 Further, increasing the required
level of development restriction does not necessarily increase the likelihood
that the valuation is correct. A more restrictive easement ostensibly results
in a larger diminution in the property’s value, so the taxpayer may actually
feel entitled to a larger deduction.
Professor Nancy McLaughlin recently suggested that the IRS make
available to taxpayers advance rulings on easement qualification and
valuation. 192 The taxpayer would first complete the easement donation and
submit an appraisal to the IRS. 193 The IRS would then accept the appraisal
or calculate its own valuation, binding the taxpayer to its decision. 194 But as
McLaughlin admits, taxpayers would only pursue an advance ruling if the
IRS could be trusted to reach a fair valuation. 195 Considering the number of
previously cited cases where the IRS pursued a very low valuation or a
valuation of zero, it seems unlikely that many taxpayers would pursue an
advance ruling.
3. Easement Valuation Restrictions.—Other commentators have
focused on restricting the amount of the deduction a taxpayer can claim,
either through limits on valuation or limits on the deduction itself.
Stephanie Jeane proposed, in response to the Whitehouse decision, that a
fixed percentage be applied to the before-value of a property based on the
loss of the rights to develop or to control the exterior of a historic
building. 196 While Jeane’s method only addresses facade easements, it
would be a simple matter to devise a similar fixed percentage for open land
easements or other conservation easements.
188

Phelps, supra note 25, at 162–64.
Id. at 163.
190
See Novack, supra note 164. The IRS’s lawsuit against the Trust for Architectural Easements
also demanded the names of 800 easement donors. Id.
191
See Graev v. Comm’r, 140 T.C. 377, 381–87 (2013); Scheidelman I, 100 T.C.M (CCH) 24, 24–
25 (2010), vacated, 682 F.3d 189 (2d Cir. 2012); see also Novack, supra note 164.
192
McLaughlin, supra note 43, at 91.
193
Id.
194
Id.
195
Id.
196
Jeane, supra note 128, at 513–16.
189

765

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

Jeane acknowledges that such a proposal places administration
efficiency above accuracy. 197 Some taxpayers would donate minimally
restrictive easements and receive a windfall, while other taxpayers would
be discouraged from donating high-value easements because the full value
would not be captured. When Jeane applied her own method to the
Whitehouse properties, the result was a value below the finding of the court
and far below that claimed by the taxpayer. 198 Determining a fixed
percentage that would apply fairly to even a majority of conservation
easements would seem to be an impossible task. Generally, rules—as
opposed to standards—are less effective where the objects of regulation are
more dissimilar from each other. 199 Because of the extreme variability in
both property and easements characteristics, attempting to replace the
current standard-based system with a rule-based system (especially one so
simple) would inevitably lead to extreme inequities.200
Alternatively, Kate Deal suggests capping the value of conservation
easements that could be accepted by a land trust each year, based on a
multiplier of annual cash donations received.201 Because a conservation
easement requires a donee as well as a donor, limiting land trusts’ (the
organizations holding and enforcing the easements) acceptance of
donations theoretically limits the overall number of donations. Deal
theorizes that the land trust’s desire to accept as much conservation
easement value as possible each year would pressure the donor to submit a
reasonable, or even low, valuation. 202 She further argues it would shift
much of the cost of qualification and valuation enforcement from the IRS
to land trusts, which are perhaps better qualified to assess conservation
purpose and easement value. 203 Presumably, competition among donors and
land trusts would further develop the conservation easement market. 204
As Deal acknowledges, land trusts with large cash resources might
consistently fail to meet the cap and not be incentivized to effectively
police easement valuations. 205 For example, the standard practice of the
Trust for Architectural Easements, a group criticized by the IRS, 206 is to
request a cash donation in conjunction with a donated easement. 207 The
197

Id. at 516.
Id. at 509, 516.
199
Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 600 (1992).
200
See id. at 591 (“[T]he simple rule is both over- and underinclusive compared to the more
complex standard.”).
201
Deal, supra note 18, at 1611–17.
202
Id. at 1613.
203
Id. at 1615.
204
Id. at 1612.
205
Id. at 1616.
206
Novack, supra note 164.
207
Program Q&A, TRUST FOR ARCHITECTURAL EASEMENTS, http://architecturaltrust.org/
easements/program-qa/ [http://perma.cc/Y6BS-YRYG].
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cash donations are used to enforce the easements held by the Trust. 208 This
arrangement would permit the Trust to effectively avoid any cap as every
donation would increase their ceiling.
Deal suggests that if abuses recur, the IRS could resort to revoking a
land trust’s tax-exempt status. 209 Indeed, the IRS recently succeeded in
obtaining an injunction against the Trust for Architectural Easements for
what the IRS alleged was a scheme encouraging overvaluation of
conservation easements. 210 Although the success of the injunction in
preventing abuse remains to be seen, the IRS surely spent a large sum on
the lawsuit and the accompanying 300 audits. 211 The IRS is now ten years
into its campaign against abusive easement valuations, yet litigation (and
its associated costs) continues apace.
Further, incentives between the donor and the donee would become
misaligned. Land trusts would have the incentive to require high cash
donations or undervalue easements to fit more under the cap, in direct
conflict with the taxpayer’s (legitimate) desire to maximize the tax benefit
of a donation. However, the burden of identifying and litigating abuse is
likely then to shift to the taxpayers, who are surely far less equipped to
combat undervaluation abuse than the IRS is to combat overvaluation. This
is not to say that land trusts will at all act maliciously, but not aggressively
pursuing the maximum donation may be grounds for a taxpayer challenge.
Both Jeane’s and Deal’s proposals have the ultimate effect of shifting the
litigation burden away from the IRS and to the taxpayer.
B. “Alternative Minimum Value” Is a New Way Forward
Current proposals do not adequately address the conservation
easement valuation problem without introducing countervailing costs that
outweigh their benefits. Further, a deduction (or credit) program based
solely on market valuation is imprecise, prone to abuse, and fails to capture
conservation benefits accruing to the community. But without flexible
valuation, some taxpayers will receive windfalls, while others will be
discouraged from donating valuable easements.
To avoid many of these valuation problems and better promote
conservation, I propose the implementation of what I term “alternative
minimum valuation.” Under this proposal, when a taxpayer claims the
conservation easement deduction, she may elect to either claim an
easement value backed by an appraisal (as the current system permits) or
208

Id.
Deal, supra note 18, at 1616–17.
210
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, D.C. Fed. Court Bars Co. from Promoting Alleged Tax
Scheme Involving Improper Easements on Historic Buildings (July 18, 2011), available at http://www.
justice.gov/opa/pr/dc-federal-court-bars-company-promoting-alleged-tax-scheme-involving-impropereasements [http://perma.cc/5XTP-7T33].
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See Novack, supra note 164.
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choose the alternative minimum valuation. The alternative minimum value
would be equal to a small fixed percentage of the before-value of the
property. This minimum value provides a basic level of compensation to
the taxpayer for donating a conservation easement while avoiding the costs
and uncertainty of valuing the easement. By making alternative minimum
valuation an election, the taxpayer is still free to claim a larger donation,
provided she can justify that valuation through the current process.
The fixed percentage applied would be a small percentage, both to
prevent abuse and to reflect the principle advanced in Evans v.
Commissioner that every conservation easement provides some minimum
level of restriction and probable loss to the taxpayer. 212 Alternative
minimum valuation would thus capture value at two points where, as
previously discussed, the market fails to do so: the value of perpetual
protection against possible changes in existing laws and regulations, and
the positive externalities that accrue to neighboring properties and
surrounding communities. Alternative minimum valuation ensures some
compensation to the taxpayer for providing those benefits.
Application of a fixed percentage to determine an easement’s value is
not a new concept. Although the Tax Court has repeatedly rejected the use
of a predetermined rate in valuation,213 even the IRS recognizes a typical
range and has used that range to determine which taxpayers to audit.214 At
least three authors have recently recommended the use of fixed
percentages. 215 However, applying a fixed percentage based even on the
low end of typical donations, such as 10%, would undoubtedly result in a
windfall to those who donate minimally qualified easements and provide a
strong incentive for abuse.
Alternative minimum valuation would use a much smaller fixed
percentage, high enough to capture the minimum benefits of a donation, but
low enough to avoid windfalls and abuse. Rather than attempt to determine
that percentage myself, I propose the IRS convene a panel of conservation
experts to determine what minimum percentage should be applied. This
panel would be similar to one proposed by Professor McLaughlin, modeled
after the successful Art Advisory Panel and a 1987 Treasury proposal. 216
Unlike McLaughlin’s panel, which would promulgate comprehensive
212
100 T.C.M. (CCH) 275, 279 (2010) (“We note that ordinarily any encumbrance on real
property, howsoever slight, would tend to have some negative effect on that property’s fair market
value. Even a nominal encumbrance that is placed by the current owner of the property would, at the
very least, deprive a subsequent owner of the opportunity of placing a similar encumbrance on that
property.”).
213
Scheidelman III, 105 T.C.M. (CCH) 1117, 1121 (2013), aff’d, 755 F.3d 148 (2d Cir. 2014)
(citing Nicoladis v. Comm’r, 55 T.C.M. (CCH) 624, 629 (1988)).
214
See Scheidelman I, 100 T.C.M (CCH) 24, 26 (2010), vacated, 682 F.3d 189 (2d Cir. 2012)
(citing an early-2000s IRS training manual).
215
Colinvaux, supra note 29, at 38; Jeane, supra note 128, at 514–15; Wolf, supra note 21, at 329.
216
McLaughlin, supra note 43, at 89–90.
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valuation standards, this panel would only be tasked with determining an
appropriate minimum percentage. The panel should have the freedom to
determine different percentages for different classes of property, such as
open land or historic buildings, as the minimum considerations are likely
different.
Use of alternative minimum valuation would also decrease
administrative, litigation, and deficiency costs to the IRS while providing
the taxpayer the opportunity to claim the deduction at a much lower risk of
challenge. The IRS could focus its efforts more acutely on those deductions
that are truly abusive, rather than merely difficult to value, and relieve the
Tax Court of conducting lengthy valuations of their own. 217 The taxpayer
would also avoid the cost of appraisal, often several thousand dollars. The
reduced cost and improved certainty would open up the conservation
easement tax deduction to less wealthy individuals and spread its adoption
as a tool of conservation.
In many cases, the value of the conservation easement would be
significantly greater than the alternative minimum valuation. Successful
valuations typically range from 10%–15% of the property’s before-value. 218
Alternative minimum valuation would permit the taxpayer to instead claim
the larger deduction, if supported by a qualified appraisal in accordance
with current regulations. Owners of high-value properties would thus
remain encouraged to place substantially restrictive conservation
easements. Of course, the valuation pitfalls remain, but at least the taxpayer
can decide whether the value of the higher deduction is worth the risk of
audit or litigation, rather than the all-or-nothing approach currently
permitted. For less wealthy owners of properties that are still worth
protecting, such as middle-class homeowners, the alternative minimum
value is a quick and easy way to protect their land and get a deduction they
might not otherwise deem worthwhile.
One point of concern with the use of alternative minimum valuation
would be that taxpayers might donate illusory or deficient conservation
easements to claim the minimum deduction. However, existing law already
stipulates minimum characteristics that an easement must have if placed on
a building in a registered historic district.219 The IRS, perhaps through the
advisory panel, could develop a set of minimum characteristics that a
conservation easement must have to claim the alternative minimum
valuation. 220 Qualification standardization would also help less wealthy
217

Though equipped to do so, the Tax Court has previously discouraged the IRS from using the
courts as a forum for hashing out valuation disputes. Id. at 86.
218
See Scheidelman II, 682 F.3d 189, 196 (2d Cir. 2012) (noting the validity of evidence, including
an out-of-print IRS publication, in the taxpayer’s appraisal showing a typical range of 10%–15%).
219
26 U.S.C. § 170 (h)(4)(B) (2012).
220
For historic buildings, this could be as simple as requiring compliance with the Secretary of the
Interior’s Standards for the Treatment of Historic Properties. See Secretary of the Interior’s Standards
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taxpayers more easily claim the deduction. And because alternative
minimum valuation is an election, taxpayers would be free to find other
ways to structure easements, subject to the stricter valuation process
currently in place. In the event that taxpayers pursue alternative easement
structures, the existence of a clear framework would help the IRS better
identify abuse and help taxpayers justify deviations from the norm,
smoothing or even reducing litigation.
Some might argue that even if minimum qualifications were set,
taxpayers might still claim easements that do not truly provide protection
because of overlap with existing law. 221 Indeed, the IRS has expressed
strong opposition to the use of the fixed percentage method for largely this
reason. 222 But as previously discussed, conservation easements provide a
benefit of perpetuity, protecting a property even if laws change or are
repealed in the future. However, if the IRS (or advisory panel) continued to
find the perpetuity benefit to be too small or too speculative, the minimum
characteristics could include a provision that the easement must
substantially restrict development in a manner not currently prohibited by
law. 223 Although such a rule might crowd out properties located in historic
districts, those property owners could still pursue the deduction without the
alternative minimum valuation election.
Others might argue that a deduction should only reflect what the
taxpayer donated, ignoring external benefits accrued by the conservation
easement. This argument is hardly unique to conservation easements,
however, as the tax code is commonly—perhaps, increasingly—used to
effect policy changes through tax deductions, credits, or penalties in lieu of
direct spending or fining. 224 Opposition on these grounds speaks to a larger
debate on the efficiencies of the tax code. But if compensating taxpayers
for the creation of positive conservation externalities begets greater positive
externalities, why shouldn’t this behavior be encouraged? 225

for the Treatment of Historic Properties, NAT’L PARK SERVICE, http://www.nps.gov/tps/standards.htm
[http://perma.cc/P2BM-K76R].
221
See, e.g., Mountanos v. Comm’r, 105 T.C.M. (CCH) 1818, 1821 (2013) (finding that state and
federal law precluded taxpayer’s claimed use).
222
Karin Gross, IRS Office of Chief Counsel, Remarks in Trying Times: Important Lessons to be
Learned From Recent Federal Tax Cases Involving Conservation Easements (May 20, 2014) (audio
recording on file with the American Bar Association Real Property, Trust & Estate Law Group).
223
Such a rule would not be uncharted territory for the IRS or the courts. See Kaufman v. Shulman,
687 F.3d 21, 32 (1st Cir. 2012) (remanding a property located in a local historic district for
consideration of valuation and commenting favorably on the ability of the IRS to craft regulations that
“curtail dubious deductions in historic districts where local regulations already protect against
alterations” without “stifling Congress’ aim to encourage legitimate easements”).
224
Cf., e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2600 (2012) (upholding the
Affordable Care Act’s individual mandate as a tax).
225
The aforementioned Whitehouse-derived hypothetical is instructive here. In such a situation, the
taxpayer’s donation is valueless to the taxpayer, yet valuable to the surrounding historic district. Under
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Alternative minimum valuation reflects the reality that the flexibility
of the current valuation system is necessary, yet is unable to effectively
capture conservation value or avoid abuse on its own. Allowing taxpayers
the choice of alternative minimum valuation provides the proper incentives
for conservation easement donations, makes the deduction more accessible
to nonwealthy individuals, and reduces the significant costs of IRS policing
and taxpayer risk. Further, wealthy individuals and high-value property
owners, who are likely to be more sophisticated donors, will be free and
better able to evaluate the trade-off between the risks and rewards inherent
in the two options.
Finally, alternative minimum valuation is preferable to other proposals
because of the simplicity of implementation. Alternative minimum
valuation can be integrated into the valuation scheme with the simple
passage of a single Treasury regulation. While qualified appraisals are
defined by statute, 226 valuation is left to Treasury regulations and
publications, which can be altered without Congressional approval.227 A tax
credit program would require comprehensive federal legislation, and
significant modifications of the current valuation regime would require
passage of several complex regulations. Once the IRS determined the fixed
percentage to be used, implementation of alternative minimum valuation
would be comparatively easy.
CONCLUSION
As many commentators have noted, the current system of valuing
conservation easements is broken. Appraisals are costly, inaccurate, and do
little to protect the taxpayer from deficiencies and penalties or the IRS from
abuse. The IRS has challenged many conservation easement deductions
recently, resulting in the Tax Court settling questions of valuation and
taxpayers seeing significant penalties. This broken system undermines the
goals of the conservation easement deduction program and threatens to
curb conservation efforts.
To resolve many of these problems, I propose that the taxpayer be
permitted to claim an alternative minimum valuation, applied as a small
fixed percentage to the before-value of the property. By giving the taxpayer
an option to pursue a streamlined, low-cost way to claim the conservation
easement deduction, taxpayers can more easily and cheaply participate in
the program, costs of enforcement and valuation to the IRS and the Tax
my proposal, rather than lose out on the benefits of the easement, the historic district (through the
federal government) is effectively paying the donor small compensation for a larger benefit.
226
26 U.S.C. § 170(f)(11)(E) (2012).
227
See Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-13 (as amended in 1996); Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14 (as amended in
2009); see also Conservation Easement Audit Techniques Guide, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE,
http://www.irs.gov/Businesses/Small-Businesses-&-Self-Employed/Conservation-Easement-AuditTechniques-Guide (last revised Jan. 3, 2012) [http://perma.cc/9UAJ-P9CC].
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Court will drop, abuse will be curbed, and the deduction will better reflect
the conservation value that the market fails to capture. Adoption of
alternative minimum valuation will further incentivize adoption of
conservation easements and become a valuable tool for conservationists.
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